The AIIS Weekly (7th April 2023)

 

Exploring Instability in Kashmir: Insights on Militancy, Violence, and Displacement from AIIS Professor and Research Scholar

On 30-31 March 2023, the  esteemed professor of AIIS Dr. Neha Sinha and Research Scholar Shahbaaz Handoo held a presentation on 'Instability in Kashmir: Militancy, Violence and Displacement'. The event took place as part of the National Conference on the 'Role of Jammu and Kashmir in the Freedom Movement of India' at Maharaja Agrasen College, Delhi University.

Water-sharing : Conflict and cooperation in South Asia

Author :  Shubhdayini Rajyalaxmi Jandev

Source : Peace for Asia

Introduction

 

Water cannot be replaced. Despite having three significant rivers—the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Indus—as well as their tributaries, South Asia is enmeshed in water resource conflicts. These rivers are transboundary and reject artificial political and geographic boundaries, which is where the problems stem from. China's inclusion in the equation has complicated the competition for water resources between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. As it comes under increasing pressure to address its own water problems, China is adopting actions that may raise fresh concerns about the availability of water in South Asia.

 

The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is in the east, and the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Indus basin is in the west. The Indus Basin's waters rise on the Tibetan plateau in China, flow across northern India, and eastern Pakistan, and eventually flows into the Arabian Sea. For both India and Pakistan, the six rivers that make up the Indus system—the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—are essential. With a basin that is 1.7 million square kilometres in size, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna is India's largest river system.

 

Water tensions are sparked and exacerbated by a number of issues that the South Asian region faces, including increased water demand brought on primarily by population growth and development imperatives, water mismanagement, unequal distribution, environmental concerns, and climate change. In South Asia, there is a freshwater issue. We need to be aware of a few fundamentals in order to simplify these problems. The region is densely inhabited, with more than 2.5 billion people. If China is counted in these numbers, the strain on these limited water supplies is amplified. Second, there is a severe lack of clean water and adequate sewage systems in many of the region's countries due to water shortages. Water stress will only worsen as the population expands. Because the majority of these nations have agrarian economies that require water-fed irrigation infrastructure, this issue of worsening hydro-politics is made worse. Water resources are also needed to meet urbanisation and industrialization demands. There is a broad and urgent need for energy, particularly hydropower. The flagrant mishandling of water supplies and the absence of suitable water storage facilities exacerbate the gravity.

 

Several reasons contribute to the shortcomings of the regional water-sharing regimes in South Asia and their tendency to escalate into wars. A holdover from colonial times is the local water battles. The subcontinent was divided according to religious principles rather than the region's transboundary river systems. The institutions established by the British Raj are to blame for the water disputes in the area. Water-sharing is a platform for renouncing or affirming exclusive sovereignty because of the very nature of transboundary water movement and its shared economic significance to the states.

 

It is crucial to involve China in the solution to the issues surrounding South Asian water disputes. Solutions must promote the sharing of water resources by enhancing communication and fostering trust. There hasn't been any institution for transboundary water cooperation yet. The dilemma of water-sharing existence in South Asia is made worse by the absence of a desirable normative framework for transboundary water sharing. We do not truly have water-sharing principles, despite the fact that there are water-sharing agreements, including treaties, in the South Asian region.

Outline of the SAARC countries' main water-sharing legal frameworks

 

India-Pakistan-

 

Pakistan faces the most severe water shortage. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006-07 states that each person had access to a little over 1000 cubic metres of water. It would become a country with a water shortage if the standard fell below it. Water insecurity is becoming increasingly problematic in the Himalayan basin due to climate change. The three main Himalayan rivers may become seasonal rivers as the glaciers melt during the next thirty years, according to reports on present trends.

 

One of the biggest unresolved issues between these two South Asian states happens to be that they both have admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. River resource competition between India and Pakistan has been a source of interstate conflict for more than 50 years. Following what was referred to as the "Indus watershed," border lines were established during the partition of British India. Concerns over the six rivers of the Indus basin are shared by Pakistan and India (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi). In 1948, both parties agreed to pay a fee for restoring the flow of water. Upstream barrages, which controlled the flow of water into Pakistan, came under Indian authority. Tensions between the two nations have been caused by the emergence of a power structure. Nevertheless, Pakistan rejected it in 1951, calling it unjust. The disagreement was not resolved until both nations signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, which set rules for how the two nations would share water. On how to interpret the long-standing Indus Water Treaty of 1960, India and Pakistan disagree. Pakistan has also expressed worry over the dams being built by India.

 

Despite this, every dispute between the two neighbours has been resolved through the IWT. The IWT has been referred to as one of "the key cases of equitable apportionment or utilisation" by the International Law Commission (ILC). 

 

The Indus River and its tributaries, which flow from India into Pakistan, are shared by both India and Pakistan, which leads to disputes over water use. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which was signed in 1960, split the Indus River basin in two, giving Pakistan exclusive rights to the western rivers and India exclusive rights to the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab).

 

Despite the deal, disagreements have developed over time. Pakistan accuses India of breaking the agreement by constructing dams and other water projects on the eastern rivers, which limits the amount of water that flows into Pakistan downstream. India, on the other hand, contends that it is only using its fair share of the water and is not breaking the terms of the agreement.

 

The building of the Kishanganga dam by India on the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum River that empties into Pakistan, is one of the key problems. Pakistan has expressed opposition to the dam's construction, claiming that doing so would breach the treaty and restrict the amount of water flowing into Pakistan. The dispute was brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which decided in 2013 that India could continue building the dam as long as Pakistan continued to get a minimal amount of water.

 

There have also been other confrontations, such as the Baglihar Dam Conflict, in which Pakistan objected to India building a dam on the Chenab River. The dispute was settled by a World Bank-appointed independent expert who determined that the dam's design did not contravene the treaty but imposed some limitations on the height of the dam and the gates to control water flow.

 

Due to the complexity of the water-sharing disputes between India and Pakistan, there must be constant communication and cooperation between the two nations. The cornerstone of the water-sharing agreements between the two nations, the Indus Waters Treaty has mainly been effective in averting serious confrontations. But cooperation between the two nations must continue if conflicts are to be settled amicably and the treaty's letter and spirit to be upheld.

 

Agriculture and animal husbandry, which are supported by the Indus, account for around 90% of Pakistan's food supply and 65% of its employment. Smaller sections are located in Tibet and eastern Afghanistan, although India (39%) and Pakistan (47%) make up the majority of the river system's users. The "Line of Control" (LOC), a physical border dividing Indian and Pakistani territory, was defined and contested in the mountains along the courses of its tributaries.

 

"For the time being, India has fired the first shot on the IWT," Sushant Sareen, a senior fellow at the ORF, a think tank with offices in New Delhi, wrote in response to India's notice asking for a change of the Treaty. Also, he issued a strong warning against creating any precedents that would inspire China to step up its "water aggression" and ramp up its dam-building in the Himalayas.

 

Also, there have been various initiatives to strengthen the two nations' water management collaboration. In addition to funding many initiatives aimed at enhancing water management in the area, the World Bank has assisted in encouraging discourse on water concerns between India and Pakistan. Combined management of certain of the water resources that Pakistan and India's share has also been proposed.

 

India-Bangladesh

 

The Teesta River, which has its source in the Himalayas and flows through Sikkim and West Bengal before merging with the Brahmaputra in Assam and the Jamuna in Bangladesh, is shared by the two amicable neighbours, and this is possibly the most problematic subject. The Ganges Water Treaty, signed in 1996 for thirty years, provides a structure for collaboration between India and Bangladesh on their eastern border, which shares 54 transboundary rivers. Yet issues with water supplies exacerbate political hostilities between them. According to Bangladesh, it does not get a fair share of water. India's 1975 construction of the Farakka barrage across the Ganges and its recently planned proposal to connect the rivers had previously caused alarm in Dhaka. The "Kashmir of Bangladesh's disputes with India" is how some people have referred to this subject. A joint commission is set up by the Treaty to keep track of the daily water flow at Farakka and act as the initial forum for addressing any disagreements or disputes between the two nations resulting from its execution. Equitable, just, and no harm to any party are the guiding principles of the Treaty.

 

India-Nepal

 

Nepal is a landlocked nation. The three 1954, 1959, and 1996 treaties make up the current framework. In 1996, the Kosi River Project led to a revision of the 1954 India-Nepal Accord. According to the agreement, Nepal gave the Chief Engineer of the Indian province of Bihar permission to investigate and survey the Project. Nepal's riparian rights are protected through the 1959 Gandak River Treaty between India and Nepal (as revised in 1964). The Treaty specifically states that Nepal's sovereignty and authority over the area it has granted to India for the project's execution are unaffected. According to the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal, the Commission's work must be motivated by the principle of doing no harm to either party. Each Party has committed to refraining from using, obstructing, or diverting Mahakali River waters in a manner that might impair their natural flow.

 

On significant rivers including the Kosi, Gandaki, Karnali, and Mahakali, Nepal and India have inked water cooperation agreements primarily for massive hydropower and irrigation projects.

Except for the Kosi barrage, no project has been finished yet. Since 1954, when India and Nepal signed the Kosi Accord, negotiations between the two countries have stopped and problems with water rights have not been resolved. Because of the flooding in the Kosi region, there have been a number of disagreements regarding this arrangement. In relation to the Kosi dam compensation problem, there have also been disagreements between India and Nepal. Additionally, Nepal saw India's building as a violation of its territorial sovereignty. The high degree of sedimentation in the Kosi River is an issue, and embankments have failed to stop the sedimentation. Storage tanks are the only alternative in this situation, and they cannot be erected without Nepal's assistance.

The Sugauli Treaty, which was signed in 1816 by the British East India Company and Nepal and defined the boundary along the Maha Kali River in Nepal, has been interpreted differently by India and Nepal historically. The river's source differs between India and Nepal in terms of which stream it originates from. The fact that the contested area is close to the Sino-Indian border gives the conflict between India and Nepal, which initially seems trivial, strategic significance.

 

India-Bhutan

 

Bhutan and India have stress-free and straightforward water connections. Bhutan produces hydropower in part thanks to its abundance of water. India provided the majority of the foreign aid used to build Bhutan's dams, and India is the country that uses the most hydropower in the country. Through the Chukha Project, Kurichu Project, 2nd Chukha Stage Projects, and Tala Dam, India is connected to the Bhutanese. Around fifty years ago, hydroelectric power cooperation between India and Bhutan was established. A Power Purchase Agreement was signed between the two nations in 2006 for a period of 35 years, allowing India to produce and buy 5000 MW of hydropower from Bhutan, with that amount rising to 10,000 MW in 2008. On the other hand, the people of Bhutan raised objections to such projects as the internal challenge in Bhutan is water accessibility.

 

The Chinese Strife

 

Particularly important to the water dynamics of the area are China and Tibet. This is simply because the Tibetan plateau serves as the source of numerous rivers and river basins in the area, making it the topmost riparian nation. India develops becoming a middle riparian power as it is entwined with China and other South Asian nations. The fact that China is an upper riparian state offers it a strategic advantage that affects the rest of the area is evident. As a result, the lower riparians are concerned about China's edge in these resources. China's enormous population and regional water shortages are to blame for the country's insatiable need for water resources. The lower riparian states are alarmed by China's purported aggressive ambitions to harness and use waterways that originate on its territory. They worry about the effects on their own resources and the environment. The absence of communication, contact, and conversation in the midst of misperceptions and suspicions on both sides makes this situation worse.

 

The glaciers that feed the Ganga and the Brahmaputra both come from China. China has the ability to construct infrastructure to purposefully stop water from flowing downstream because it is an upstream riparian area. There is a lack of confidence between the two neighbours as a result of Chinese inclinations in the past to withhold information about its hydropower projects. Despite the two neighbours having signed multiple Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on improving communication, China's aspirations to build dams and divide the water flowing through the Brahmaputra, known as Yarlung Zangbo in China, are a source of concern. India and Bangladesh are lower riparian nations that depend on the Brahmaputra's water for agriculture. Four more dams will be constructed by China on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. India and Bangladesh are both concerned that Beijing will be able to divert or store water thanks to these dams in times of emergency.

 

Key Regulatory Frameworks for Water Sharing among SAARC Countries

 

Hydroelectric-generating projects are one of the main causes of disputes in the Indus Water Treaty. The Baglihar run-of-the-river hydroelectric generating plants on the Chenab River were one such issue. The Baglihar conflict was approached from a political and legal standpoint by Pakistan, which demanded respect for the Indus Waters Treaty's terms and tried to allay its fears regarding the use of water as a strategic weapon in times of war. India, on the other hand, saw the disagreement as a disagreement over how hydropower projects should be designed. The Kishenganga Arbitration between India and Pakistan confirmed that the minimum flow is subject to revision despite the res judicata principle.

 

In addition to the problematic power generation projects between India and Pakistan, the IWT has been deemed insufficient primarily due to its perceived limitations to address issues like environmental security and the capability of joint working mechanisms, even as diplomatic efforts to prevent these issues from escalating into disputes. A challenge of climate change in the Himalayan region, the water that is released into the sea by the Indus river system, rising salinity with less water flowing into the sea, unfavourable impacts on stream flow and saltwater infiltration due to excessive groundwater pumping, are some other disputed issues. Conflicts and conflicting claims may result from these problems. Although future cooperation is mentioned in the IWT, experts on both sides concur that it is difficult to build cooperation on a treaty of division. Bangladesh's water allocation under the Convention has reportedly displeased commentators. This legal document is less effective than the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal since the Treaty prefers "political means, not legal, to resolve any dispute.

There is no mechanism for other riparian nations of the Ganges basin to establish a long-term sustainable solution to the current situation and for integrated management of the basin under the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh.

 

Although there are water-sharing agreements for the Ganges and Brahmaputra, not all of the states in the basin regions are included. Bangladesh notes that the Ganges provides drinking water to the people, nourishes agriculture, forestry, and fishery, serve as the primary means of transportation, keeps back the salinity from the Bay of Bengal, and play a prominent role in the ecosystem of the region. In addition, Bangladesh's dry season has been attributed to India's water diversion. India notes that Bangladesh is fed by alternate river systems and has a problem with excess water, much of which goes unused down to the sea, but it has no alternative source of water to flush the Hooghly and sustain Calcutta port. Shifts in the Ganges water discharge may be caused by both climatic fluctuation and human appropriation, it has been suggested.

 

Bangladesh countered India's allegation that the low flow was caused solely by water diversions upstream of Farakka and attributed it to the low winter and summer rainfall in northern India. Regrettably, Bangladesh and India were unable to agree to maintain a consistent flow downstream because the technopolitical discussion between the two on the impact of the Farakka Dam was based on anecdotal evidence and observation rather than a quantitative analysis of water requirements.

 

The Teesta River water-sharing issue between India and Bangladesh is increasingly significant. Ad hoc agreement from 1983 never saw implementation. Bangladesh recommended in 2004 that 10% of the Teesta waters be maintained for natural flow, 39% be given to India, 36% be given to Bangladesh, and the remaining be distributed proportionately. India, however, stressed that scientific research must be finished first. It is widely held that India's domestic politics.

 

The 1954 India-Nepal Kosi Project Agreement has been regarded as ―inappropriate since ―the barrage-building was based on knowledge of an engineering fraternity prevalent on the non-silting rivers of Europe and North America. In addition, the 1959 Gandak Treaty between India and Nepal has been criticised as "a disastrous deal for Nepal" because it reduced that country's access to Gandaki water for use on its soil. Article 9 of this Treaty, which restricts Nepal's right to use its water just within Nepal, is still something that Nepal wishes to change. The Mahakali Treaty was up for ratification by Nepal in 1997, and despite numerous attempts to resolve it, a disagreement between India and Nepal are known as the Kalapani issue erupted.

 

As a result, there is now a trust gap between the two nations as a result of the Pancheshwar Dam project, the relocating of Nepali citizens for Indian interests, and the lack of confidence that Nepal will be paid fairly for the electricity it exports to India.

 

Finally, more confrontations between South Asian nations as well as within Indian states are possible as a result of Indian initiatives to interconnect rivers. Thus, India needs to ―secure the concurrence of other riparians, which may not only be difficult but also full of tension and conflicting positions. While the rise in demand remains a catalyst for conflict, India's unilateral actions and the challenge of separating water disputes from other bilateral issues compound and exacerbate the issues raised by South Asia's disjointed legal framework for water sharing.

 

Way Forward

 

Given the number of factors that are bringing the area closer to a significant water stress conflict, water disputes will only get worse in the future. The region would need to reduce and manage the obvious hazards brought on by the disagreements in order to go forward.

 

First and foremost, it is important to promote a spirit of cooperation among these transboundary rivers, especially in light of the pressing need for interdependence and the developing water scarcity. China and other nations on the subcontinent must address their individual needs for growth. They will be able to accomplish this more effectively if they work well together. Depoliticizing the topic of water is essential, as is bringing all of these nations to the negotiating table and fostering greater communication and openness among them. Second, in order to reduce waste and assure conservation, it is crucial for these nations to create their own effective water management systems as well as learn from others' best practices. Coordination and cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels are crucial. This could be accomplished by using regional organisations like the South Asian Organization for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Due to China's growing importance as a player in regional water issues, South Asian nations must also include it in all of these initiatives.

 

Prioritizing natural solutions that increase mutual advantages for all parties through methods of group planning and conflict sharing is necessary. In order to go beyond only using water for DRR in a transboundary watercourse, it is necessary to increase risk information for effective governance and rethink the approach to disaster risk reduction in the policy frameworks. More than 850 million people depend on the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basins, strengthening the people-centred approach to transboundary water governance. In order to guarantee that the impacted communities are included in the governmental schemes, programmes, debates, and decision-making systems, a collective, coordinated, and collaborative approach to transboundary water governance must be developed.

References:

·       Building peace over water in South Asia: The Watercourses Convention ... (no date). Available at: https://www.athensjournals.gr/law/2018-4-1-1-Pratap.pdf (Accessed: March 6, 2023).

·       Shifting lands, flowing waters: Transboundary cooperation for water and ... (no date). Available at: https://nidm.gov.in/pdf/trgReports/2021/March/Report_16-19March2021sp.pdf (Accessed: March 6, 2023).

·       CO11072: Water disputes in South Asia: Can the region come together? (no date) Think Tank and Graduate School. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nts/1544-water-disputes-in-south-asia/#.ZAYxuXZBzIU (Accessed: March 7, 2023).

·       -, A.B. et al. (2018) South Asian water conflict, South Asia Journal. Available at: http://southasiajournal.net/south-asian-water-conflict/#:~:text=The%20history%20of%20water%20dispute,the%20water%20of%20Ganges%20into (Accessed: March 7, 2023).

·       Water conflict and cooperation between India and Pakistan (no date) Climate. Available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan (Accessed: March 8, 2023).

The Global Mirror (Edition : March, 2023)

 

India’s Foreign Aid Allocation – A Balance of Smart Management and Robust Foreign Policy

Author - Anhad Jakhmola

A healthy flow of funds as foreign aid with areas of strategic interest not only suits India’s national interests but also displays its ideological maturity.

Source : Financialexpress

As The Modi Government announced the budget for the year 2023, much of the fanfare went towards the important decisions around tax and the increase or decrease of expenditures in various sectors. From significant jumps to noted decreases that have made the news, the budget was well-received by most and often, as Clockwork, critiqued by those wanting to make an impression of improvement or political compulsion. However, the area of interest I wish to bring is the amount of foreign aid the Modi government has allocated this year and a possible explanation for it. It is pertinent to consider such important aspects around India’s international stage as well as their diplomatic push which further can bring insight as to what their strategy is behind the amount allocated this year.

In the Union Budget 2023-2024 announced on Wednesday, the total aid to countries was reduced to Rs 5408.37 crore this year from Rs 6292.30 in Budget 2022-2023. This may be seen in terms of doubt as to whether the centre is allocating funds in other sectors while ignoring the importance of aid to foreign nations where the Indian diaspora has a strong presence. However, what may seem on the outside isn’t the same within. The Modi government has increased funds to neighbouring nations like Bhutan which has received the highest allocation this year. Given the strategic importance of that country and its close ties with India, it is no surprise that the Himalayan kingdom features importantly in our strategic policy with our neighbours. 

Read further at : https://samvadaworld.com/national/indias-foreign-aid-allocation-a-balance-of-smart-management-and-robust-foreign-policy/

The author is a distinguished alumnus of the esteemed Amity Institute of International Studies.

The AIIS Weekly (3rd March 2023)

 

VICE ADMIRAL KK NAYYAR FELLOWSHIP CONFERENCE 2023

 Report by Alithia Paul and Ayushi Attri

The “Vice Admiral KK Nayyar Fellowship” was established at the NMF, in May of 2020, by the family of the late Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, PVSM, AVSM, IN (26 December 1929-18 September 2018), who was the founding chairman of the NMF and was a veritable Colossus within the maritime domain This Fellowship promotes and supports intellectual and policy- relevant research on subjects of maritime consequence to India and, in so doing, commemorates the life and achievements of this evangelist of Indian maritime thinking. The inaugural project of the Fellowship has addressed the issue of India’s coastal resilience vis-à-vis its urban agglomerations. The research was carried out by Dr (Ms) Chime Youdon, Associate Fellow, NMF, and Dr Saurabh Thakur (now a consultant at the MEA).

“INDIA’S COASTAL RESILIENCE VIS-À-VIS URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS”

It is an established and well-recognised fact that the world is passing through a climate- crisis of monumental proportions. South Asia in general, and India in particular, is highly vulnerable to an entire range of hydrometeorological hazards that are rapidly rising, both in terms of their intensity and frequency. Irrespective of the precise causal-factors, the effects of this rise in temperature are uniformly deleterious. Indian metropolises on the country’s western coast, for example, which had hitherto been accustomed to relatively calm maritime conditions, have been witnessing a sharp surge in extreme cyclonic activity these past few years. High-intensity cyclones such as Ockhi (2017), Vayu (2019), Nisarga (2020), and Tauktae (2021), have wreaked year-on-year havoc in India’s coastal areas. Given the magnitude of socio-economic and environmental impact, it is painfully obvious that climate-proofing of coastal cities is a task to which policymakers and planners must bend their efforts with alacrity and sharp focus.

As part of its own ongoing contribution to India’s quest for economically and politically viable policy-relevant solutions, the National Maritime Foundation has made the “India’s Coastal Resilience Vis-à-vis Urban Agglomerations” the central theme of its inaugural Vice Admiral KK Nayyar Fellowship Conference (KKNFC-2023). It aims to engage government officials, academia, DRR experts, civil society, and industry, private sector to better understand the different approaches and to identify best practices in the field of coastal urban planning and policy making across the Indian coastal regions.

The conference on "India's Coastal Resilience vis-à-vis Urban Agglomerations" started with the conceptual overarch by Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, who briefed us about the significance of the conference and contribution of late vice admiral KK Nayyar. This was followed by a short speech by vice admiral KK Nayyar’s daughter Ms. Gita Nayyar. Later a monograph was introduced focusing on problems of coastal areas (specifically Mumbai). The panel consisted of 5 experts who talked extensively about the problems, challenges, causes and probable solutions to the coastal regions. Climate change, sea level rise and pollution was the major part of the discussion. Resilience in ecology was defined as the capacity of ecology to absorb the disturbance unlike the definition of resilience in physics.

Problems due to climate change were called “gray rhino” events because of there slow approaching yet heavily impactful nature. Additional problems of coastal disturbance includes climate refugees, operational loans, security concerns and so on.

Some solutions offered to manage risk included:

1. Pursuing reduction of no regret vulnerabilities- ex: timely cleaning of drains

2. Diversifying risks: ex: fishermen diversifying their source of income

3. Operationality: making sure the infrastructure is suitable or can be changed if needed.

Keeping in mind the natural solutions like maintaining a healthy ecosystem and role of mangroves coupled with policy intervention by the state if and when needed. Furthermore it was pointed out that it is not easy to pinpoint the cause and effects when many things at once are taking place and the consequences are not linear when we talk about systematic risks (in urban coastal areas specifically). The research needs to be multi hazardous and on multi sector within India by Indians.

On the second day, the conference focused on the following main themes:

1. Resilience of India’s Coastal Cities: Its Challenges

2. Resilience of India’s Coastal Cities: Its Current Policies

3. Building Coastal Resilience: The Way Ahead

The keynote address was given by Dr. G A Ramadass who talked about deep ocean mission: announced by Government of India On Sept 2021 by PM Narendra Modi and it spans for 5 years with an allotment of 4780 cr. He further talked about the EEZ of India which is 2 million kilometres.

An exploratory mining in deep seas was signed with UN tag-lined as the need for a Blue economy. He further mentioned about 6 verticals which are:

1. Decade of ocean science for sustainable development: covering the areas of Non living, living and ocean commerce (minerals, energy, fishing, transport and tourism)

2. Development of technologies, Deep sea mining, underwater vehicles and underwater robotics- to design, develop and deploy suitable technologies in the deep blue.

3. Development of suitable technology to combat climate change

4. Marine biodiversity and biotechnology

5. Deep Ocean survey and exploration

6. Energy and freshwater sources

Advanced marine station and ocean biology: Capacity building and hrd

He further discussed about the Samudrayaan Matsya 6000 which is a specialised deep water suspended submarine which will help researchers and scientists tap the resources in the Mariana Trench with ease.

The first session consisted of panelists from civil societies, government and private agencies who discussed enhancing the lives of fishing communities in the fishing sector. These panelists were Mr. Abhinash Mohanty, Ms. Devleena Bhattacharjee, Mr. Vijai Dharmamony and Dr. Deepak Samuel V. The second session also contained panelists from France discussing critical infrastructures required for building a coastline safe for the fishing communities and the ecosystem at large.

The AIIS Weekly (17th February 2023)

 

The AIIS Weekly (10th February 2023)

 

Amity University Visits Operationalizing the “Indo-Pacific oceans initiative” (IPOI)

Name of Event: Operationalizing the “Indo-Pacific oceans initiative” (IPOI)

Date of the Event: November 23rd, 24th, 25th, 2022

Location of the Event: Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi

Attendees: Naval staff, Think tanks, Students, journalists.

Sponsoring Organization: National Maritime Foundation

Conference Summary

IPRD-2022 was conducted in physical format in New Delhi, through six professional sessions

that spreaded over a three-day period covering the 23rd, 24th and 25th of November 2022. The

Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue (IPRD) organized by National Maritime Foundation, is the

Indian Navy’s apex-level international dialogue at the strategic level that aims at generating

fresh ideas for regional cooperation based upon the shared interest. IPRD- 2022 focused on

specific themes of multilateral options in ‘holistic’ maritime security cooperation, building

maritime connectivity, capacity-building and capability enhancement, developing a regional

blue economy, and disaster risk-reduction and management. Speakers from across 17

participating nations emphasized on leveraging the physical and social scientific approach for

capacity building, encouraging intellectual discourse on maritime matters.

The first session of the IPRD was termed as the ‘Margdarshan’ session’ in which Admiral R Hari

Kumar, the Chief of the Naval Staff emphasized that the IPRD represented the Samvad or

‘Dialogue’ aspect of the 5 Ss– Samman, Samvad, Sahyog, Shanti, and Samridhi – enunciated by

the Hon’ble Prime Minister. On the first day of commencement the distinguished speakers were

Shri Bhupender Yadav, the Hon’ble Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, and

Shri Ajay Bhatt, the Hon’ble Minister of State for Defence. Panelists from India also specifieed

India’s aspirations and strategies to cope with transnational challanges, ranging from climate

change to coping natural disasters, piracy of contraband materials, terrorism and cooperative

management of maritime resources.

During the three day event, insightful discussions were held on the issues of contemporaneous

relevance across the length and breadth of the Indo-pacific. Eminent speakers from within and

across the borders illuminated the three day seminar with the highest standards of intellectual

excellence, providing invaluable insights to policy makers, not just in India, but in the

constituent countries of the region and to all maritime powers that operate within it.

The final day of the session commenced with the keynote address from the hon’ble Raksha

Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh. The concluding day of the IPRD was enriched by the intellectual

presence of prolific International speakers who spoke on the Indo-Pacific perspectives from

Japan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Maldives and France. The IPRD 2022 culminated with the closing

address by Vice Admiral SN Ghormade, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. The event witnessed a

remarkably active participation by the members and staff of the National Maritime Foundation

(NMF), members of the Indian Navy and veterans, active citizens, international and national

delegates, Students, journalists and various think tanks.

Amity University visits American Centre to Discuss US-India Relations

On 17th November 2022, The US Embassy hosted a student interaction session at the American Centre with the US Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Carlos Del Toro. The students from AIIS had a fruitful discussion with the chief guest where Mr. Del Toro gave a clear understanding about US being India’s major defence partner as well as their naval partnership being crucial. The US wants to invest in India marks a major point of increasing in the bonding of the two nations for which they have emphasised upon the need for free sea links which will also uplift their economic status.

The discussion further went on the cultural transformation as well as the issues of cyber warfare and traditional-non traditional issues of security. Mr. Del Toro also expressed his opinion that they speculate a lack of cooperation between Russia and China and they believe that the US can strongly deter China from their current behaviour. 

In the end, AIIS raised a question pertaining to US’s confidence on the members of BRICS to which Mr. Del Toro simply replied that they have high confidence on India, Brazil and South Africa. However they find it skeptical to have the same for Russia and China.

VIJIGISHU 2020