Author : Shubhdayini Rajyalaxmi Jandev
Source : Peace for Asia
Introduction
Water
cannot be replaced. Despite having three significant rivers—the Ganges,
Brahmaputra, and Indus—as well as their tributaries, South Asia is enmeshed in water
resource conflicts. These rivers are transboundary and reject artificial
political and geographic boundaries, which is where the problems stem from.
China's inclusion in the equation has complicated the competition for water
resources between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. As it comes under
increasing pressure to address its own water problems, China is adopting
actions that may raise fresh concerns about the availability of water in South
Asia.
The
Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is in the east, and the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Indus
basin is in the west. The Indus Basin's waters rise on the Tibetan plateau in
China, flow across northern India, and eastern Pakistan, and eventually flows
into the Arabian Sea. For both India and Pakistan, the six rivers that make up
the Indus system—the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—are
essential. With a basin that is 1.7 million square kilometres in size, the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna is India's largest river system.
Water
tensions are sparked and exacerbated by a number of issues that the South Asian
region faces, including increased water demand brought on primarily by
population growth and development imperatives, water mismanagement, unequal
distribution, environmental concerns, and climate change. In South Asia, there
is a freshwater issue. We need to be aware of a few fundamentals in order to
simplify these problems. The region is densely inhabited, with more than 2.5
billion people. If China is counted in these numbers, the strain on these limited
water supplies is amplified. Second, there is a severe lack of clean water and
adequate sewage systems in many of the region's countries due to water
shortages. Water stress will only worsen as the population expands. Because the
majority of these nations have agrarian economies that require water-fed
irrigation infrastructure, this issue of worsening hydro-politics is made
worse. Water resources are also needed to meet urbanisation and
industrialization demands. There is a broad and urgent need for energy,
particularly hydropower. The flagrant mishandling of water supplies and the
absence of suitable water storage facilities exacerbate the gravity.
Several
reasons contribute to the shortcomings of the regional water-sharing regimes in
South Asia and their tendency to escalate into wars. A holdover from colonial
times is the local water battles. The subcontinent was divided according to
religious principles rather than the region's transboundary river systems. The
institutions established by the British Raj are to blame for the water disputes
in the area. Water-sharing is a platform for renouncing or affirming exclusive
sovereignty because of the very nature of transboundary water movement and its
shared economic significance to the states.
It
is crucial to involve China in the solution to the issues surrounding South
Asian water disputes. Solutions must promote the sharing of water resources by
enhancing communication and fostering trust. There hasn't been any institution
for transboundary water cooperation yet. The dilemma of water-sharing existence
in South Asia is made worse by the absence of a desirable normative framework
for transboundary water sharing. We do not truly have water-sharing principles,
despite the fact that there are water-sharing agreements, including treaties,
in the South Asian region.
Outline of
the SAARC countries' main water-sharing legal frameworks
India-Pakistan-
Pakistan
faces the most severe water shortage. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006-07
states that each person had access to a little over 1000 cubic metres of water.
It would become a country with a water shortage if the standard fell below it.
Water insecurity is becoming increasingly problematic in the Himalayan basin
due to climate change. The three main Himalayan rivers may become seasonal
rivers as the glaciers melt during the next thirty years, according to reports
on present trends.
One
of the biggest unresolved issues between these two South Asian states happens
to be that they both have admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. River
resource competition between India and Pakistan has been a source of interstate
conflict for more than 50 years. Following what was referred to as the
"Indus watershed," border lines were established during the partition
of British India. Concerns over the six rivers of the Indus basin are shared by
Pakistan and India (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi). In 1948,
both parties agreed to pay a fee for restoring the flow of water. Upstream
barrages, which controlled the flow of water into Pakistan, came under Indian
authority. Tensions between the two nations have been caused by the emergence
of a power structure. Nevertheless, Pakistan rejected it in 1951, calling it
unjust. The disagreement was not resolved until both nations signed the Indus
Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, which set rules for how the two nations would
share water. On how to interpret the long-standing Indus Water Treaty of 1960,
India and Pakistan disagree. Pakistan has also expressed worry over the dams
being built by India.
Despite
this, every dispute between the two neighbours has been resolved through the
IWT. The IWT has been referred to as one of "the key cases of equitable
apportionment or utilisation" by the International Law Commission (ILC).
The
Indus River and its tributaries, which flow from India into Pakistan, are
shared by both India and Pakistan, which leads to disputes over water use. The
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which was signed in 1960, split the Indus River
basin in two, giving Pakistan exclusive rights to the western rivers and India
exclusive rights to the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) (Indus, Jhelum,
and Chenab).
Despite
the deal, disagreements have developed over time. Pakistan accuses India of
breaking the agreement by constructing dams and other water projects on the
eastern rivers, which limits the amount of water that flows into Pakistan
downstream. India, on the other hand, contends that it is only using its fair
share of the water and is not breaking the terms of the agreement.
The
building of the Kishanganga dam by India on the Kishanganga River, a tributary
of the Jhelum River that empties into Pakistan, is one of the key problems.
Pakistan has expressed opposition to the dam's construction, claiming that doing
so would breach the treaty and restrict the amount of water flowing into
Pakistan. The dispute was brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) in The Hague, which decided in 2013 that India could continue building
the dam as long as Pakistan continued to get a minimal amount of water.
There
have also been other confrontations, such as the Baglihar Dam Conflict, in
which Pakistan objected to India building a dam on the Chenab River. The
dispute was settled by a World Bank-appointed independent expert who determined
that the dam's design did not contravene the treaty but imposed some
limitations on the height of the dam and the gates to control water flow.
Due
to the complexity of the water-sharing disputes between India and Pakistan,
there must be constant communication and cooperation between the two nations.
The cornerstone of the water-sharing agreements between the two nations, the
Indus Waters Treaty has mainly been effective in averting serious
confrontations. But cooperation between the two nations must continue if
conflicts are to be settled amicably and the treaty's letter and spirit to be
upheld.
Agriculture
and animal husbandry, which are supported by the Indus, account for around 90%
of Pakistan's food supply and 65% of its employment. Smaller sections are
located in Tibet and eastern Afghanistan, although India (39%) and Pakistan
(47%) make up the majority of the river system's users. The "Line of
Control" (LOC), a physical border dividing Indian and Pakistani territory,
was defined and contested in the mountains along the courses of its
tributaries.
"For
the time being, India has fired the first shot on the IWT," Sushant
Sareen, a senior fellow at the ORF, a think tank with offices in New Delhi,
wrote in response to India's notice asking for a change of the Treaty. Also, he
issued a strong warning against creating any precedents that would inspire
China to step up its "water aggression" and ramp up its dam-building
in the Himalayas.
Also,
there have been various initiatives to strengthen the two nations' water
management collaboration. In addition to funding many initiatives aimed at
enhancing water management in the area, the World Bank has assisted in
encouraging discourse on water concerns between India and Pakistan. Combined
management of certain of the water resources that Pakistan and India's share
has also been proposed.
India-Bangladesh
The
Teesta River, which has its source in the Himalayas and flows through Sikkim
and West Bengal before merging with the Brahmaputra in Assam and the Jamuna in
Bangladesh, is shared by the two amicable neighbours, and this is possibly the
most problematic subject. The Ganges Water Treaty, signed in 1996 for thirty
years, provides a structure for collaboration between India and Bangladesh on
their eastern border, which shares 54 transboundary rivers. Yet issues with
water supplies exacerbate political hostilities between them. According to
Bangladesh, it does not get a fair share of water. India's 1975 construction of
the Farakka barrage across the Ganges and its recently planned proposal to
connect the rivers had previously caused alarm in Dhaka. The "Kashmir of
Bangladesh's disputes with India" is how some people have referred to this
subject. A joint commission is set up by the Treaty to keep track of the daily
water flow at Farakka and act as the initial forum for addressing any
disagreements or disputes between the two nations resulting from its execution.
Equitable, just, and no harm to any party are the guiding principles of the
Treaty.
India-Nepal
Nepal
is a landlocked nation. The three 1954, 1959, and 1996 treaties make up the
current framework. In 1996, the Kosi River Project led to a revision of the
1954 India-Nepal Accord. According to the agreement, Nepal gave the Chief
Engineer of the Indian province of Bihar permission to investigate and survey
the Project. Nepal's riparian rights are protected through the 1959 Gandak
River Treaty between India and Nepal (as revised in 1964). The Treaty specifically
states that Nepal's sovereignty and authority over the area it has granted to
India for the project's execution are unaffected. According to the 1996
Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal, the Commission's work must be
motivated by the principle of doing no harm to either party. Each Party has
committed to refraining from using, obstructing, or diverting Mahakali River
waters in a manner that might impair their natural flow.
On
significant rivers including the Kosi, Gandaki, Karnali, and Mahakali, Nepal
and India have inked water cooperation agreements primarily for massive
hydropower and irrigation projects.
Except
for the Kosi barrage, no project has been finished yet. Since 1954, when India
and Nepal signed the Kosi Accord, negotiations between the two countries have
stopped and problems with water rights have not been resolved. Because of the
flooding in the Kosi region, there have been a number of disagreements
regarding this arrangement. In relation to the Kosi dam compensation problem, there
have also been disagreements between India and Nepal. Additionally, Nepal saw
India's building as a violation of its territorial sovereignty. The high degree
of sedimentation in the Kosi River is an issue, and embankments have failed to
stop the sedimentation. Storage tanks are the only alternative in this
situation, and they cannot be erected without Nepal's assistance.
The
Sugauli Treaty, which was signed in 1816 by the British East India Company and
Nepal and defined the boundary along the Maha Kali River in Nepal, has been
interpreted differently by India and Nepal historically. The river's source
differs between India and Nepal in terms of which stream it originates from.
The fact that the contested area is close to the Sino-Indian border gives the
conflict between India and Nepal, which initially seems trivial, strategic
significance.
India-Bhutan
Bhutan
and India have stress-free and straightforward water connections. Bhutan
produces hydropower in part thanks to its abundance of water. India provided
the majority of the foreign aid used to build Bhutan's dams, and India is the
country that uses the most hydropower in the country. Through the Chukha
Project, Kurichu Project, 2nd Chukha Stage Projects, and Tala Dam, India is
connected to the Bhutanese. Around fifty years ago, hydroelectric power
cooperation between India and Bhutan was established. A Power Purchase
Agreement was signed between the two nations in 2006 for a period of 35 years,
allowing India to produce and buy 5000 MW of hydropower from Bhutan, with that
amount rising to 10,000 MW in 2008. On the other hand, the people of Bhutan
raised objections to such projects as the internal challenge in Bhutan is water
accessibility.
The
Chinese Strife
Particularly
important to the water dynamics of the area are China and Tibet. This is simply
because the Tibetan plateau serves as the source of numerous rivers and river
basins in the area, making it the topmost riparian nation. India develops
becoming a middle riparian power as it is entwined with China and other South
Asian nations. The fact that China is an upper riparian state offers it a
strategic advantage that affects the rest of the area is evident. As a result,
the lower riparians are concerned about China's edge in these resources. China's
enormous population and regional water shortages are to blame for the country's
insatiable need for water resources. The lower riparian states are alarmed by
China's purported aggressive ambitions to harness and use waterways that
originate on its territory. They worry about the effects on their own resources
and the environment. The absence of communication, contact, and conversation in
the midst of misperceptions and suspicions on both sides makes this situation
worse.
The
glaciers that feed the Ganga and the Brahmaputra both come from China. China
has the ability to construct infrastructure to purposefully stop water from
flowing downstream because it is an upstream riparian area. There is a lack of
confidence between the two neighbours as a result of Chinese inclinations in
the past to withhold information about its hydropower projects. Despite the two
neighbours having signed multiple Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on
improving communication, China's aspirations to build dams and divide the water
flowing through the Brahmaputra, known as Yarlung Zangbo in China, are a source
of concern. India and Bangladesh are lower riparian nations that depend on the
Brahmaputra's water for agriculture. Four more dams will be constructed by
China on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. India and Bangladesh are both concerned that
Beijing will be able to divert or store water thanks to these dams in times of
emergency.
Key
Regulatory Frameworks for Water Sharing among SAARC Countries
Hydroelectric-generating
projects are one of the main causes of disputes in the Indus Water Treaty. The
Baglihar run-of-the-river hydroelectric generating plants on the Chenab River
were one such issue. The Baglihar conflict was approached from a political and
legal standpoint by Pakistan, which demanded respect for the Indus Waters
Treaty's terms and tried to allay its fears regarding the use of water as a
strategic weapon in times of war. India, on the other hand, saw the
disagreement as a disagreement over how hydropower projects should be designed.
The Kishenganga Arbitration between India and Pakistan confirmed that the
minimum flow is subject to revision despite the res judicata principle.
In addition to the
problematic power generation projects between India and Pakistan, the IWT has
been deemed insufficient primarily due to its perceived limitations to address
issues like environmental security and the capability of joint working
mechanisms, even as diplomatic efforts to prevent these issues from escalating
into disputes. A challenge of climate change in the Himalayan region, the water
that is released into the sea by the Indus river system, rising salinity with
less water flowing into the sea, unfavourable impacts on stream flow and
saltwater infiltration due to excessive groundwater pumping, are some other
disputed issues. Conflicts and conflicting claims may result from these
problems. Although future cooperation is mentioned in the IWT, experts on both
sides concur that it is difficult to build cooperation on a treaty of division.
Bangladesh's water allocation under the Convention has reportedly displeased
commentators. This legal document is less effective than the Mahakali Treaty
between India and Nepal since the Treaty prefers "political means, not
legal, to resolve any dispute.
There is no
mechanism for other riparian nations of the Ganges basin to establish a
long-term sustainable solution to the current situation and for integrated
management of the basin under the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and
Bangladesh.
Although there are
water-sharing agreements for the Ganges and Brahmaputra, not all of the states
in the basin regions are included. Bangladesh notes that the Ganges provides
drinking water to the people, nourishes agriculture, forestry, and fishery,
serve as the primary means of transportation, keeps back the salinity from the
Bay of Bengal, and play a prominent role in the ecosystem of the region. In
addition, Bangladesh's dry season has been attributed to India's water
diversion. India notes that Bangladesh is fed by alternate river systems and
has a problem with excess water, much of which goes unused down to the sea, but
it has no alternative source of water to flush the Hooghly and sustain Calcutta
port. Shifts in the Ganges water discharge may be caused by both climatic
fluctuation and human appropriation, it has been suggested.
Bangladesh
countered India's allegation that the low flow was caused solely by water
diversions upstream of Farakka and attributed it to the low winter and summer
rainfall in northern India. Regrettably, Bangladesh and India were unable to
agree to maintain a consistent flow downstream because the technopolitical
discussion between the two on the impact of the Farakka Dam was based on
anecdotal evidence and observation rather than a quantitative analysis of water
requirements.
The Teesta River
water-sharing issue between India and Bangladesh is increasingly significant.
Ad hoc agreement from 1983 never saw implementation. Bangladesh recommended in
2004 that 10% of the Teesta waters be maintained for natural flow, 39% be given
to India, 36% be given to Bangladesh, and the remaining be distributed
proportionately. India, however, stressed that scientific research must be
finished first. It is widely held that India's domestic politics.
The 1954
India-Nepal Kosi Project Agreement has been regarded as ―inappropriate since
―the barrage-building was based on knowledge of an engineering fraternity
prevalent on the non-silting rivers of Europe and North America. In addition,
the 1959 Gandak Treaty between India and Nepal has been criticised as "a
disastrous deal for Nepal" because it reduced that country's access to
Gandaki water for use on its soil. Article 9 of this Treaty, which restricts
Nepal's right to use its water just within Nepal, is still something that Nepal
wishes to change. The Mahakali Treaty was up for ratification by Nepal in 1997,
and despite numerous attempts to resolve it, a disagreement between India and
Nepal are known as the Kalapani issue erupted.
As a result, there
is now a trust gap between the two nations as a result of the Pancheshwar Dam
project, the relocating of Nepali citizens for Indian interests, and the lack
of confidence that Nepal will be paid fairly for the electricity it exports to
India.
Finally, more
confrontations between South Asian nations as well as within Indian states are
possible as a result of Indian initiatives to interconnect rivers. Thus, India
needs to ―secure the concurrence of other riparians, which may not only be
difficult but also full of tension and conflicting positions. While the rise in
demand remains a catalyst for conflict, India's unilateral actions and the
challenge of separating water disputes from other bilateral issues compound and
exacerbate the issues raised by South Asia's disjointed legal framework for
water sharing.
Way
Forward
Given
the number of factors that are bringing the area closer to a significant water
stress conflict, water disputes will only get worse in the future. The region
would need to reduce and manage the obvious hazards brought on by the
disagreements in order to go forward.
First
and foremost, it is important to promote a spirit of cooperation among these
transboundary rivers, especially in light of the pressing need for
interdependence and the developing water scarcity. China and other nations on
the subcontinent must address their individual needs for growth. They will be
able to accomplish this more effectively if they work well together.
Depoliticizing the topic of water is essential, as is bringing all of these
nations to the negotiating table and fostering greater communication and
openness among them. Second, in order to reduce waste and assure conservation,
it is crucial for these nations to create their own effective water management
systems as well as learn from others' best practices. Coordination and
cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels are crucial. This
could be accomplished by using regional organisations like the South Asian
Organization for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Due to China's growing
importance as a player in regional water issues, South Asian nations must also
include it in all of these initiatives.
Prioritizing
natural solutions that increase mutual advantages for all parties through
methods of group planning and conflict sharing is necessary. In order to go
beyond only using water for DRR in a transboundary watercourse, it is necessary
to increase risk information for effective governance and rethink the approach
to disaster risk reduction in the policy frameworks. More than 850 million
people depend on the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basins,
strengthening the people-centred approach to transboundary water governance. In
order to guarantee that the impacted communities are included in the governmental
schemes, programmes, debates, and decision-making systems, a collective,
coordinated, and collaborative approach to transboundary water governance must
be developed.
References:
·
Building peace over water in
South Asia: The Watercourses Convention ... (no
date). Available at: https://www.athensjournals.gr/law/2018-4-1-1-Pratap.pdf
(Accessed: March 6, 2023).
·
Shifting lands, flowing
waters: Transboundary cooperation for water and ...
(no date). Available at: https://nidm.gov.in/pdf/trgReports/2021/March/Report_16-19March2021sp.pdf
(Accessed: March 6, 2023).
·
CO11072: Water disputes in
South Asia: Can the region come together? (no date)
Think Tank and Graduate School. Available at:
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nts/1544-water-disputes-in-south-asia/#.ZAYxuXZBzIU
(Accessed: March 7, 2023).
·
-, A.B. et al. (2018) South
Asian water conflict, South Asia Journal. Available at:
http://southasiajournal.net/south-asian-water-conflict/#:~:text=The%20history%20of%20water%20dispute,the%20water%20of%20Ganges%20into
(Accessed: March 7, 2023).
·
Water conflict and
cooperation between India and Pakistan (no date) Climate.
Available at:
https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan
(Accessed: March 8, 2023).
No comments:
Post a Comment