The Global Mirror (Edition : April, 2023)

 

AIIS Weekly (24th April 2023)

 

Africa's Continental Divide: The Birth of a New Geopolitical Era of Prospects and Challenges

 Author : Dr. Neha Sinha and Arindam Goswami

Source : Scroll.in

Abstract

The African continent has been regarded as a unified landmass for centuries, sheltering diverse cultures, resources, and languages. However, recent geological studies have revealed the birth of a rare and extraordinary phenomenon occurring in the continent that is set to shape the course of African history. According to Geophysical Research Letters, a peer-reviewed research journal, the continent could potentially split into two separate regions due to the formation of the East African Rift. Found in the deserts of Ethiopia in 2005, this 35-mile-long crack marked the beginning of the creation of a new sea. However, such a situation also brings forward the geopolitical dilemma pertaining to the continent with challenges to its borders, as well as allocation of the resources. This article aims to provide the potential geopolitical evolution with implications on security, regional integration and its impact on the global balance of power.

Introduction

The Earth is a dynamic and ever-changing planet, which is being constantly shaped by geological phenomena that ultimately affect our lives and social occurrences. One such phenomenon that has piqued the world’s attention is the splitting of Africa into two new continents, with the formation of a new ocean highly expected in the process with the potential for the evolution of the geopolitical scenario encompassing it. The African continent has been regarded as a unified landmass for centuries, sheltering diverse cultures, resources, and languages. However, recent geological studies have revealed the birth of the rare and extraordinary phenomenon, occurring in the continent that is set to shape the course of African history. This remarkable phenomenon, known as East African Rift System, occurs along a vast fault line stretching from Ethiopia to Tanzania. The geological forces at work in this process are immense, as the African plate is gradually pulling apart from the Arabian plate, creating a rift zone that is widening at an average rate of one inch per year (Cloete 2023). Over millions of years, this process will result in the separation of the African continent into two distinct parts, with the creation of a new ocean between them.

With vast and multifaceted implications, the significant geopolitical, economic and environmental impacts could reshape the world which includes the creation of new nations being potential along with borders, the development of new trade routes and the possibility for increased competition over resources, the splitting of Africa has the capacity to significantly alter the continent's political and economic landscape and beyond. Simultaneously, the emergence of a new ocean could have profound strategic and environmental impacts, reshaping the geopolitical landscape. It will further present new challenges and opportunities, with the formation of new chokepoints and sea lanes, changes in ocean currents and temperature, and the potential for new marine ecosystems to emerge.

This article will explore the possible geopolitical, economic and environmental implications of the splitting of Africa into two new continents and the creation of a new ocean. It will further examine the prospects and challenges pertaining to this process, from the impact on existing trade routes and the balance of power in the region as well as supplemental anticipation presented by this geological marvel.

Read Further at : https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/april/10/africas-continental-divide-the-birth-of-a-new-geopolitical-era-of-prospects-and-challenges

Dr. Neha Sinha is a Senior Assistant Professor in Amity Institute of International Studies and Arindam Goswami is post graduate student of our institute.

The AIIS Weekly (7th April 2023)

 

Exploring Instability in Kashmir: Insights on Militancy, Violence, and Displacement from AIIS Professor and Research Scholar

On 30-31 March 2023, the  esteemed professor of AIIS Dr. Neha Sinha and Research Scholar Shahbaaz Handoo held a presentation on 'Instability in Kashmir: Militancy, Violence and Displacement'. The event took place as part of the National Conference on the 'Role of Jammu and Kashmir in the Freedom Movement of India' at Maharaja Agrasen College, Delhi University.

EU Border Migrant Crisis with Belarus 2021: A New Geopolitical Challenge

 Author : Nadia Rawat

Source : CNN

ABSTRACT

The latest available data on the number of illegal border crossings (IBCs), produced by Brussels’ border management agency- Frontex, clearly projects the EU’s vulnerability rooted in refugee migration. The problem of refugee migration has always been a challenge for Brussels. From the sinking of refugee boats in the Mediterranean Sea to the case of Sarah Mardini, a Syrian swimmer, who faced charges for saving drowning refugees in the Mediterranean, continues to emphasize the question of Human Rights Violations and the Legal Code that Brussels is bound to follow with regard to the treatment of the refugees within its territory. The vulnerability of the European Union that the article talks about is not exclusively about refugee migration or how Brussels deals with it but rather about the weaponization of migrants along the EU’s borders to affect specific political outcomes. The article intends to delineate the conflict that led to a migrant crisis along the borders of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia in 2021 and its various aspects that pose a challenge to the policy in place that concerns the management of Brussels’ external borders. Brussels’ reaction to the refugee migrant crisis with Belarus has attracted much criticism. Looking at the EU’s previous attempts to deal with the issue of illegal border crossings reveals the gaps to be addressed in the long term. 

THE TREND 

Routes from the Mediterranean sea & the Balkan region are the epicenter of migratory challenges at EU’s shores. During 2015, when the EU experienced its largest migrant wave that recorded more than a million migrants at EU’s shores, its Eastern land borders registered only 1,920 illegal border crossings(IBCs)  which in itself was the highest it registered since 2008. The figures are largely dictated by its geography. Recently in 2021, Poland, Lithuania & Latvia which make up the EU's Eastern land borders, saw a surprising spike in IBC with a total of 8,184 in 2021 alone.

 

The three countries share their borders with Belarus. The Eastern Land borders of the EU to the north are far away from the conflict zones in Africa & West Asia. But in 2021, it is on these borders where a crisis transpired  leaving thousands stranded in freezing conditions. A crisis largely engineered by the leader of Belarus - Alexander Lukashenko also known as ‘Europe’s Last Dictator’. More than a dozen deaths have been recorded since. 

 

Figure : 1

 

CONFLICT BACKGROUND

Early August 2020, Alexander Lukashenko claimed victory in Belarus’ presidential elections for the 6th time since 1994, with his previous term largely believed to have been rigged. Despite the pandemic, Lukashenko’s victory was followed by huge protests demanding his resignation. Lukashenko responded with a brutal crackdown on the protesters with many in prison, hundreds were beaten & a few died. 

 

Soon after the election results were announced, the EU foreign ministers while addressing the developments in Belarus reiterated - their call to end the violence against peaceful protesters, demanded immediate release of those detained & refused to recognise the election results. The conditions in Belarus’ however didn’t change. At least 6,700 arrests were made according to The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs (reported by Amnesty International 30/10/2020) in the first four days of protests. The EU called for the European Council to impose restrictive measures including asset freeze & travel ban. The first round of Sanctions against 40 individuals was imposed, while the Second round included Lukashenko himself and many prominent people in the regime. The third round of sanctions followed by the end of December, 2020. 

 

On 23rd May, 2021, Ryanair Flight 4978 within Belarusian Airspace flying from Athens, Greece to Vilnius, Lithuania was diverted to Minsk Airport after the Belarusian authorities reported a bomb on board. The flight was allowed to depart after an opposition activist/journalist Roman Protasevich & his partner were arrested. To this, Brussels responded with new sanctions and condemned the forced landing of the flight. Alexander Lukashenko then threatened to not cooperate on the issue of migration on EU borders. By June 2021 EU had banned Belarusian air carriers of all kinds from entering their airspace & accessing their airports. The EU's fourth package of sanctions were issued in the light of continuing serious human rights violations & brutal repression. 

 

Lukashenko then engineered a crisis at its borders with the EU. The Sanctions triggered what the Frontex(EU’s border agency) in its Risk Analysis for 2022/2023 described Lukashenko’s actions as “aggressive instrumentalisation of migration in a hybrid campaign” for political purposes. The widening scope of sanctions by Brussels & aggressive retaliation by Belarus flagged the beginning of a dangerous struggle between the two actors which soon became consequential for those who left their homes to avoid conflict only to be a part of another . 

 

Later 2021, under widening sanctions by Brussels, Lukashenko announced that he wont stop any migrants from entering the EU, effectively ending its cooperation on border management. Belarus controlled travel agencies & state airlines worked in tandem to get migrants from West Asia to Minsk. Belarusian Authorities started offering tourists visas, easing travel restrictions for thousands in conflict ridden zones. Number of direct flights from Damascus, Baghdad, Istanbul & Dubai to Minsk doubled from previous year’s figures with reduced prices. Belarus’ promotion of tours to Minsk involved many agents in West Asia giving out fallacious information & instructions to possible migrants. Social media platforms were used effectively for this purpose.

 

Opening up of Belarus’ borders encouraged thousands to arrive at Minsk under a false pretense of entering the EU. Upon their arrival, Belarusian state agencies dumped hundreds of migrants at the border with the EU member states, instructing them to cross over into territories of Poland, Lithuania & Latvia. There have been reports of abuses by the Belarusian authorities & use of force against many who failed to cross over to the EU. Those who wished to go back to the countries they came from were denied the option & were forced to keep on trying to cross over. The migrants were left stranded between the forests along the eastern border in the cold. Those who tried to make it to Minsk on foot were pushed back while those who successfully crossed the border, over to the EU were sent back without due process for determination of refugees & upholding their basic human rights. 

 

Initially, Humanitarian aid & assistance, NGO’s & Civil Societies were denied access to the border areas. By September 2021, a state of emergency was imposed by Poland, Latvia & Lithuania in the areas along the border which limited movement at major border crossings thus restricting access to unauthorized individuals including many journalists, medics, human rights activists, etc. Lithuania & Poland started to consider building a border wall with Belarus. By November the situation aggravated to a level where we see Donald Tusk, a prominent Polish politician, suggested seeking help from NATO, of which Poland is a member. 

 

Masses of migrants began pushing at Bruzgi-Kuźnica border crossing between Poland & Belarus which became the epicenter of the conflict. The checkpoint was later closed. A large group of migrants pushed against Polish authorities resulting in retaliation that turned into a stand off. The Polish border personnel used water cannons & tear gas in response to aggression by the migrants assisted by the Belarusian guards. Poland started collective expulsions & summary returns for those who were successful in crossing the border which sometimes resulted in injuries. Those injured were given medical treatment & allowed to temporarily stay on Polish territory on humanitarian grounds while their families were forced to leave, many times separating them. 

 

The stranded migrants are subjected to abuses, many robbed, beaten & left in the cold. For this, both Poland & Belarus have a shared responsibility. At the time of writing this article, the situation persists. There have been efforts by humanitarian groups to assist migrants seek asylum & apply for refugee status in Belarus & in the EU. The UN's intervention amidst the crisis helped a few return to their countries & enabled NGO’s to participate. The human cost of the crisis largely remains ignored.

 

By June 2022, Poland successfully completed building a wall along its border with Belarus & had lifted the state of emergency. Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine that displaced millions of Ukrainians brings to light the ease with which the EU took in Ukrainian migrants in contrast to those who are still at the borders with Belarus and are being subjected to abuse by both sides. A report by Amnesty International was titled : Latvia: Refugees and migrants arbitrarily detained, tortured and forced to ‘voluntarily’ return to their countries.

 

PART OF POLAND

People displaced from their countries due to political instability, violence, economic or environmental reasons or otherwise, deserve certain basic human rights everywhere in the world. In the case of the EU, they should be subjected to a due process of law and a fair procedure that allows them to apply for refugee status along with proper documentation to stay, if they seek to do so. 

 

For those who seek asylum, Article 19 of the Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The EUROPEAN UNION,  provides protection in the event of removal, expulsion & extradition. It further prohibits collective expulsion. Article 19 also states that “No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 

In 2008, The European Parliament & the Council of the EU adopted ‘Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals’; commonly referred to as ‘the Return Directive’. It ensures that aliens illegally staying within the territory of the EU are sent back to their home countries with due procedures which are fair & transparent. The Return Directive also states that the basic human rights & the dignity of the migrants are to be respected. The Principle of non-refoulement is to be respected.  

This is not the first time that the EU member states have ignored their own legal code under the EU law as well as the International Law.

 

TURKEY

In 2015, the EU recorded its largest migrant wave across the borders in a single year. In 2015, West Asia was reeling under intense conflict that forced 1,336,010 people to migrate to Europe by the end of 2015 which was a 3,492% jump from the figures recorded around the same time the previous year. The report also indicated the major route taken by the migrants was through Turkey. 

 

Figure : 2 (WB-RAN data, Feb 2016)

 

In March 2016 EU & Turkey signed an agreement on cooperation with conditions that all migrants irregularly crossing into Greece through Turkey will be returned to Turkey while the arrangement’s cost will be covered by the EU. Turkey is to take “necessary measures” to prevent opening up of illegal crossing from their area(land & sea) into the EU. In return, the EU will liberalize its visa restrictions for Turkish citizens. The EU will also disburse 3 billion Euros initially & the progress of the deal will be reviewed in 2018 again, if the commitments materialize, EU shall provide an additional 3 billion euros to Turkey. The migrant influx dropped post the deal. 

 

Figure : 3  ( Source : Western Balkans Quarterly Quarter 2 • April–June 2016 )

 

The Bloc’s strategy is to provide its neighbors with incentives to hold migrants within their territories, thus forming a buffer zone around it in an effort to keep migrants away from the EU. 

 

However, The development in EU-Turkey relations regarding migration gave Turkey a new aspect to exploit. An already criticized approach of the bloc to pay its neighboring countries surfaced when the deal with Turkey eventually led to a diplomatic standoff. Turkey isn’t the only state that the EU has paid to hold migrants. The states surrounding the EU, especially in the Mediterranean region will always look for more incentives and use migrants as weapons to pressure the EU. 

 

WITHIN THE EU 

The EU member states close to the conflict zones with a coastal border in the south(known as Blue borders) and land borders in the east(known as Green borders) like France or Greece or Poland are affected the most while those far away from conflict areas like Luxembourg or the Netherlands do not face a migratory challenge. This disparity at times has led to differences between the member states in terms of distribution of refugees amongst themselves or mobilizing funds for border management at the bloc’s external borders. Migration hasn’t only been challenging the EU altogether but also the EU as one entity. 

 

WAY FORWARD

From a realist perspective, the EU’s neighbors will not be accommodative of its interests. Alexander Lukashenko manufactured a crisis at the borders that allowed him to exert pressure over the EU which seems to be working. Far from being expensive, the ability to create such a crisis doesn’t stem from the Belarusian government’s political or military structure nor its material capabilities but it’s the power that Belarus holds by the virtue of its geography.  

 

The larger problem however rests in the instability, poverty, low levels of development, violence and lack of economic opportunities in West Asia and Africa. As these factors are an active source of displacement, the importance of a stable Geo-strategic MENA region and its overall development should be central to understanding the challenge of migration. The block needs a better strategy to tackle the issue in the long term. 

 

In the light of the crisis manufactured by Lukashenko, Migration in recent times has taken on a new geopolitical significance. 

 

Sources : 

1. WB-RAN -data as of 4 February 2016 (Frontex Western Balkans Quarterly Report October-December 2015)
2. Frontex Border Control Reports : 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022-2023. 
3. HumanRightsWatch Report / Polish Border Crisis 
4. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S SUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PURSUANT TO HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL RESOLUTION 45/1 ON "THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BELARUS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND IN ITS AFTERMATH" ADOPTED ON 18 SEPTEMBER 2020
5. EU - Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 144/16  Press EN 
6. The Return Directive 2008/115/EC - European Implementation Assessment. 

Water-sharing : Conflict and cooperation in South Asia

Author :  Shubhdayini Rajyalaxmi Jandev

Source : Peace for Asia

Introduction

 

Water cannot be replaced. Despite having three significant rivers—the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Indus—as well as their tributaries, South Asia is enmeshed in water resource conflicts. These rivers are transboundary and reject artificial political and geographic boundaries, which is where the problems stem from. China's inclusion in the equation has complicated the competition for water resources between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. As it comes under increasing pressure to address its own water problems, China is adopting actions that may raise fresh concerns about the availability of water in South Asia.

 

The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is in the east, and the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Indus basin is in the west. The Indus Basin's waters rise on the Tibetan plateau in China, flow across northern India, and eastern Pakistan, and eventually flows into the Arabian Sea. For both India and Pakistan, the six rivers that make up the Indus system—the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—are essential. With a basin that is 1.7 million square kilometres in size, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna is India's largest river system.

 

Water tensions are sparked and exacerbated by a number of issues that the South Asian region faces, including increased water demand brought on primarily by population growth and development imperatives, water mismanagement, unequal distribution, environmental concerns, and climate change. In South Asia, there is a freshwater issue. We need to be aware of a few fundamentals in order to simplify these problems. The region is densely inhabited, with more than 2.5 billion people. If China is counted in these numbers, the strain on these limited water supplies is amplified. Second, there is a severe lack of clean water and adequate sewage systems in many of the region's countries due to water shortages. Water stress will only worsen as the population expands. Because the majority of these nations have agrarian economies that require water-fed irrigation infrastructure, this issue of worsening hydro-politics is made worse. Water resources are also needed to meet urbanisation and industrialization demands. There is a broad and urgent need for energy, particularly hydropower. The flagrant mishandling of water supplies and the absence of suitable water storage facilities exacerbate the gravity.

 

Several reasons contribute to the shortcomings of the regional water-sharing regimes in South Asia and their tendency to escalate into wars. A holdover from colonial times is the local water battles. The subcontinent was divided according to religious principles rather than the region's transboundary river systems. The institutions established by the British Raj are to blame for the water disputes in the area. Water-sharing is a platform for renouncing or affirming exclusive sovereignty because of the very nature of transboundary water movement and its shared economic significance to the states.

 

It is crucial to involve China in the solution to the issues surrounding South Asian water disputes. Solutions must promote the sharing of water resources by enhancing communication and fostering trust. There hasn't been any institution for transboundary water cooperation yet. The dilemma of water-sharing existence in South Asia is made worse by the absence of a desirable normative framework for transboundary water sharing. We do not truly have water-sharing principles, despite the fact that there are water-sharing agreements, including treaties, in the South Asian region.

Outline of the SAARC countries' main water-sharing legal frameworks

 

India-Pakistan-

 

Pakistan faces the most severe water shortage. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006-07 states that each person had access to a little over 1000 cubic metres of water. It would become a country with a water shortage if the standard fell below it. Water insecurity is becoming increasingly problematic in the Himalayan basin due to climate change. The three main Himalayan rivers may become seasonal rivers as the glaciers melt during the next thirty years, according to reports on present trends.

 

One of the biggest unresolved issues between these two South Asian states happens to be that they both have admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. River resource competition between India and Pakistan has been a source of interstate conflict for more than 50 years. Following what was referred to as the "Indus watershed," border lines were established during the partition of British India. Concerns over the six rivers of the Indus basin are shared by Pakistan and India (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi). In 1948, both parties agreed to pay a fee for restoring the flow of water. Upstream barrages, which controlled the flow of water into Pakistan, came under Indian authority. Tensions between the two nations have been caused by the emergence of a power structure. Nevertheless, Pakistan rejected it in 1951, calling it unjust. The disagreement was not resolved until both nations signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, which set rules for how the two nations would share water. On how to interpret the long-standing Indus Water Treaty of 1960, India and Pakistan disagree. Pakistan has also expressed worry over the dams being built by India.

 

Despite this, every dispute between the two neighbours has been resolved through the IWT. The IWT has been referred to as one of "the key cases of equitable apportionment or utilisation" by the International Law Commission (ILC). 

 

The Indus River and its tributaries, which flow from India into Pakistan, are shared by both India and Pakistan, which leads to disputes over water use. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which was signed in 1960, split the Indus River basin in two, giving Pakistan exclusive rights to the western rivers and India exclusive rights to the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab).

 

Despite the deal, disagreements have developed over time. Pakistan accuses India of breaking the agreement by constructing dams and other water projects on the eastern rivers, which limits the amount of water that flows into Pakistan downstream. India, on the other hand, contends that it is only using its fair share of the water and is not breaking the terms of the agreement.

 

The building of the Kishanganga dam by India on the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum River that empties into Pakistan, is one of the key problems. Pakistan has expressed opposition to the dam's construction, claiming that doing so would breach the treaty and restrict the amount of water flowing into Pakistan. The dispute was brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which decided in 2013 that India could continue building the dam as long as Pakistan continued to get a minimal amount of water.

 

There have also been other confrontations, such as the Baglihar Dam Conflict, in which Pakistan objected to India building a dam on the Chenab River. The dispute was settled by a World Bank-appointed independent expert who determined that the dam's design did not contravene the treaty but imposed some limitations on the height of the dam and the gates to control water flow.

 

Due to the complexity of the water-sharing disputes between India and Pakistan, there must be constant communication and cooperation between the two nations. The cornerstone of the water-sharing agreements between the two nations, the Indus Waters Treaty has mainly been effective in averting serious confrontations. But cooperation between the two nations must continue if conflicts are to be settled amicably and the treaty's letter and spirit to be upheld.

 

Agriculture and animal husbandry, which are supported by the Indus, account for around 90% of Pakistan's food supply and 65% of its employment. Smaller sections are located in Tibet and eastern Afghanistan, although India (39%) and Pakistan (47%) make up the majority of the river system's users. The "Line of Control" (LOC), a physical border dividing Indian and Pakistani territory, was defined and contested in the mountains along the courses of its tributaries.

 

"For the time being, India has fired the first shot on the IWT," Sushant Sareen, a senior fellow at the ORF, a think tank with offices in New Delhi, wrote in response to India's notice asking for a change of the Treaty. Also, he issued a strong warning against creating any precedents that would inspire China to step up its "water aggression" and ramp up its dam-building in the Himalayas.

 

Also, there have been various initiatives to strengthen the two nations' water management collaboration. In addition to funding many initiatives aimed at enhancing water management in the area, the World Bank has assisted in encouraging discourse on water concerns between India and Pakistan. Combined management of certain of the water resources that Pakistan and India's share has also been proposed.

 

India-Bangladesh

 

The Teesta River, which has its source in the Himalayas and flows through Sikkim and West Bengal before merging with the Brahmaputra in Assam and the Jamuna in Bangladesh, is shared by the two amicable neighbours, and this is possibly the most problematic subject. The Ganges Water Treaty, signed in 1996 for thirty years, provides a structure for collaboration between India and Bangladesh on their eastern border, which shares 54 transboundary rivers. Yet issues with water supplies exacerbate political hostilities between them. According to Bangladesh, it does not get a fair share of water. India's 1975 construction of the Farakka barrage across the Ganges and its recently planned proposal to connect the rivers had previously caused alarm in Dhaka. The "Kashmir of Bangladesh's disputes with India" is how some people have referred to this subject. A joint commission is set up by the Treaty to keep track of the daily water flow at Farakka and act as the initial forum for addressing any disagreements or disputes between the two nations resulting from its execution. Equitable, just, and no harm to any party are the guiding principles of the Treaty.

 

India-Nepal

 

Nepal is a landlocked nation. The three 1954, 1959, and 1996 treaties make up the current framework. In 1996, the Kosi River Project led to a revision of the 1954 India-Nepal Accord. According to the agreement, Nepal gave the Chief Engineer of the Indian province of Bihar permission to investigate and survey the Project. Nepal's riparian rights are protected through the 1959 Gandak River Treaty between India and Nepal (as revised in 1964). The Treaty specifically states that Nepal's sovereignty and authority over the area it has granted to India for the project's execution are unaffected. According to the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal, the Commission's work must be motivated by the principle of doing no harm to either party. Each Party has committed to refraining from using, obstructing, or diverting Mahakali River waters in a manner that might impair their natural flow.

 

On significant rivers including the Kosi, Gandaki, Karnali, and Mahakali, Nepal and India have inked water cooperation agreements primarily for massive hydropower and irrigation projects.

Except for the Kosi barrage, no project has been finished yet. Since 1954, when India and Nepal signed the Kosi Accord, negotiations between the two countries have stopped and problems with water rights have not been resolved. Because of the flooding in the Kosi region, there have been a number of disagreements regarding this arrangement. In relation to the Kosi dam compensation problem, there have also been disagreements between India and Nepal. Additionally, Nepal saw India's building as a violation of its territorial sovereignty. The high degree of sedimentation in the Kosi River is an issue, and embankments have failed to stop the sedimentation. Storage tanks are the only alternative in this situation, and they cannot be erected without Nepal's assistance.

The Sugauli Treaty, which was signed in 1816 by the British East India Company and Nepal and defined the boundary along the Maha Kali River in Nepal, has been interpreted differently by India and Nepal historically. The river's source differs between India and Nepal in terms of which stream it originates from. The fact that the contested area is close to the Sino-Indian border gives the conflict between India and Nepal, which initially seems trivial, strategic significance.

 

India-Bhutan

 

Bhutan and India have stress-free and straightforward water connections. Bhutan produces hydropower in part thanks to its abundance of water. India provided the majority of the foreign aid used to build Bhutan's dams, and India is the country that uses the most hydropower in the country. Through the Chukha Project, Kurichu Project, 2nd Chukha Stage Projects, and Tala Dam, India is connected to the Bhutanese. Around fifty years ago, hydroelectric power cooperation between India and Bhutan was established. A Power Purchase Agreement was signed between the two nations in 2006 for a period of 35 years, allowing India to produce and buy 5000 MW of hydropower from Bhutan, with that amount rising to 10,000 MW in 2008. On the other hand, the people of Bhutan raised objections to such projects as the internal challenge in Bhutan is water accessibility.

 

The Chinese Strife

 

Particularly important to the water dynamics of the area are China and Tibet. This is simply because the Tibetan plateau serves as the source of numerous rivers and river basins in the area, making it the topmost riparian nation. India develops becoming a middle riparian power as it is entwined with China and other South Asian nations. The fact that China is an upper riparian state offers it a strategic advantage that affects the rest of the area is evident. As a result, the lower riparians are concerned about China's edge in these resources. China's enormous population and regional water shortages are to blame for the country's insatiable need for water resources. The lower riparian states are alarmed by China's purported aggressive ambitions to harness and use waterways that originate on its territory. They worry about the effects on their own resources and the environment. The absence of communication, contact, and conversation in the midst of misperceptions and suspicions on both sides makes this situation worse.

 

The glaciers that feed the Ganga and the Brahmaputra both come from China. China has the ability to construct infrastructure to purposefully stop water from flowing downstream because it is an upstream riparian area. There is a lack of confidence between the two neighbours as a result of Chinese inclinations in the past to withhold information about its hydropower projects. Despite the two neighbours having signed multiple Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on improving communication, China's aspirations to build dams and divide the water flowing through the Brahmaputra, known as Yarlung Zangbo in China, are a source of concern. India and Bangladesh are lower riparian nations that depend on the Brahmaputra's water for agriculture. Four more dams will be constructed by China on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. India and Bangladesh are both concerned that Beijing will be able to divert or store water thanks to these dams in times of emergency.

 

Key Regulatory Frameworks for Water Sharing among SAARC Countries

 

Hydroelectric-generating projects are one of the main causes of disputes in the Indus Water Treaty. The Baglihar run-of-the-river hydroelectric generating plants on the Chenab River were one such issue. The Baglihar conflict was approached from a political and legal standpoint by Pakistan, which demanded respect for the Indus Waters Treaty's terms and tried to allay its fears regarding the use of water as a strategic weapon in times of war. India, on the other hand, saw the disagreement as a disagreement over how hydropower projects should be designed. The Kishenganga Arbitration between India and Pakistan confirmed that the minimum flow is subject to revision despite the res judicata principle.

 

In addition to the problematic power generation projects between India and Pakistan, the IWT has been deemed insufficient primarily due to its perceived limitations to address issues like environmental security and the capability of joint working mechanisms, even as diplomatic efforts to prevent these issues from escalating into disputes. A challenge of climate change in the Himalayan region, the water that is released into the sea by the Indus river system, rising salinity with less water flowing into the sea, unfavourable impacts on stream flow and saltwater infiltration due to excessive groundwater pumping, are some other disputed issues. Conflicts and conflicting claims may result from these problems. Although future cooperation is mentioned in the IWT, experts on both sides concur that it is difficult to build cooperation on a treaty of division. Bangladesh's water allocation under the Convention has reportedly displeased commentators. This legal document is less effective than the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal since the Treaty prefers "political means, not legal, to resolve any dispute.

There is no mechanism for other riparian nations of the Ganges basin to establish a long-term sustainable solution to the current situation and for integrated management of the basin under the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh.

 

Although there are water-sharing agreements for the Ganges and Brahmaputra, not all of the states in the basin regions are included. Bangladesh notes that the Ganges provides drinking water to the people, nourishes agriculture, forestry, and fishery, serve as the primary means of transportation, keeps back the salinity from the Bay of Bengal, and play a prominent role in the ecosystem of the region. In addition, Bangladesh's dry season has been attributed to India's water diversion. India notes that Bangladesh is fed by alternate river systems and has a problem with excess water, much of which goes unused down to the sea, but it has no alternative source of water to flush the Hooghly and sustain Calcutta port. Shifts in the Ganges water discharge may be caused by both climatic fluctuation and human appropriation, it has been suggested.

 

Bangladesh countered India's allegation that the low flow was caused solely by water diversions upstream of Farakka and attributed it to the low winter and summer rainfall in northern India. Regrettably, Bangladesh and India were unable to agree to maintain a consistent flow downstream because the technopolitical discussion between the two on the impact of the Farakka Dam was based on anecdotal evidence and observation rather than a quantitative analysis of water requirements.

 

The Teesta River water-sharing issue between India and Bangladesh is increasingly significant. Ad hoc agreement from 1983 never saw implementation. Bangladesh recommended in 2004 that 10% of the Teesta waters be maintained for natural flow, 39% be given to India, 36% be given to Bangladesh, and the remaining be distributed proportionately. India, however, stressed that scientific research must be finished first. It is widely held that India's domestic politics.

 

The 1954 India-Nepal Kosi Project Agreement has been regarded as ―inappropriate since ―the barrage-building was based on knowledge of an engineering fraternity prevalent on the non-silting rivers of Europe and North America. In addition, the 1959 Gandak Treaty between India and Nepal has been criticised as "a disastrous deal for Nepal" because it reduced that country's access to Gandaki water for use on its soil. Article 9 of this Treaty, which restricts Nepal's right to use its water just within Nepal, is still something that Nepal wishes to change. The Mahakali Treaty was up for ratification by Nepal in 1997, and despite numerous attempts to resolve it, a disagreement between India and Nepal are known as the Kalapani issue erupted.

 

As a result, there is now a trust gap between the two nations as a result of the Pancheshwar Dam project, the relocating of Nepali citizens for Indian interests, and the lack of confidence that Nepal will be paid fairly for the electricity it exports to India.

 

Finally, more confrontations between South Asian nations as well as within Indian states are possible as a result of Indian initiatives to interconnect rivers. Thus, India needs to ―secure the concurrence of other riparians, which may not only be difficult but also full of tension and conflicting positions. While the rise in demand remains a catalyst for conflict, India's unilateral actions and the challenge of separating water disputes from other bilateral issues compound and exacerbate the issues raised by South Asia's disjointed legal framework for water sharing.

 

Way Forward

 

Given the number of factors that are bringing the area closer to a significant water stress conflict, water disputes will only get worse in the future. The region would need to reduce and manage the obvious hazards brought on by the disagreements in order to go forward.

 

First and foremost, it is important to promote a spirit of cooperation among these transboundary rivers, especially in light of the pressing need for interdependence and the developing water scarcity. China and other nations on the subcontinent must address their individual needs for growth. They will be able to accomplish this more effectively if they work well together. Depoliticizing the topic of water is essential, as is bringing all of these nations to the negotiating table and fostering greater communication and openness among them. Second, in order to reduce waste and assure conservation, it is crucial for these nations to create their own effective water management systems as well as learn from others' best practices. Coordination and cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels are crucial. This could be accomplished by using regional organisations like the South Asian Organization for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Due to China's growing importance as a player in regional water issues, South Asian nations must also include it in all of these initiatives.

 

Prioritizing natural solutions that increase mutual advantages for all parties through methods of group planning and conflict sharing is necessary. In order to go beyond only using water for DRR in a transboundary watercourse, it is necessary to increase risk information for effective governance and rethink the approach to disaster risk reduction in the policy frameworks. More than 850 million people depend on the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basins, strengthening the people-centred approach to transboundary water governance. In order to guarantee that the impacted communities are included in the governmental schemes, programmes, debates, and decision-making systems, a collective, coordinated, and collaborative approach to transboundary water governance must be developed.

References:

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·       Shifting lands, flowing waters: Transboundary cooperation for water and ... (no date). Available at: https://nidm.gov.in/pdf/trgReports/2021/March/Report_16-19March2021sp.pdf (Accessed: March 6, 2023).

·       CO11072: Water disputes in South Asia: Can the region come together? (no date) Think Tank and Graduate School. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nts/1544-water-disputes-in-south-asia/#.ZAYxuXZBzIU (Accessed: March 7, 2023).

·       -, A.B. et al. (2018) South Asian water conflict, South Asia Journal. Available at: http://southasiajournal.net/south-asian-water-conflict/#:~:text=The%20history%20of%20water%20dispute,the%20water%20of%20Ganges%20into (Accessed: March 7, 2023).

·       Water conflict and cooperation between India and Pakistan (no date) Climate. Available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan (Accessed: March 8, 2023).